Devolution and Accountability Effects in the Public Provision of Water Services in Indonesia

This paper separately evaluates how devolution and accountability, two distinct aspects of the decentralization reforms implemented in Indonesia in the year 2001, influenced the public provision of water services. Using household level data it is found that thedevolution of responsibility does not necessarily affect the provision of public services. Our findings show that the quality of publicly provided water decreased only in cities in which devolution was accompanied by a change in accountability. Robustness checks suggest that these results are driven by changes in the accountability framework rather than trends in the health services.Indonesia, decentralization, accountability, devolution, water

Decentralization and service delivery

Dissatisfied with centralized approaches to delivering local public services, a large number of countries are decentralizing responsibility for these services to lower-level, locally elected governments. The results have been mixed. The paper provides a framework for evaluating the benefits and costs, in terms of service delivery, of different approaches to decentralization, based on relationships of accountability between different actors in the delivery chain. Moving from a model of central provision to that of decentralization to local governments introduces a new relationship of accountability-between national and local policymakers-while altering existing relationships, such as that between citizens and elected politicians. Only by examining how these relationships change can we understand why decentralization can, and sometimes cannot, lead to better service delivery. In particular, the various instruments of decentralization-fiscal, administrative, regulatory, market, and financial-can affect the incentives facing service providers, even though they relate only to local policymakers. Likewise, and perhaps more significantly, the incentives facing local and national politicians can have a profound effect on the provision of local services. Finally, the process of implementing decentralization can be as important as the design of the system in influencing service delivery outcomes.Public Sector Economics&Finance,National Governance,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Governance Indicators

Decentralization and public services : the case of immunization

The author studies the impact of political decentralization on childhood immunization, an essential public service provided in almost all countries. He examines the relationship empirically using a time-series data set of 140 low- and middle-income countries from 1980 to 1997. The author finds that decentralization has different effects in low- and middle-income countries. In the low-income group, decentralized countries have higher coverage rates than centralized ones, with an average difference of 8.5 percent for measles and DTP3 vaccines. In the middle-income group, the reverse effect is observed: decentralized countries have lower coverage rates than centralized ones, with an average difference of 5.2 percent for the same vaccines. Both results are significant at the 99 percent level. Modifiers of the decentralization-immunization relationship also differ in the two groups. In the low-income group, development assistance reduces the gains from decentralization. In the middle-income group, democratic government mitigates the negative effects of decentralization, and decentralization reverses the negative effects of ethnic tension and ethno-linguistic fractionalization, but institutional quality and literacy rates have no interactive effect either way. Similar results are obtained whether decentralization is measured with a dichotomous categorical variable or with more specific measures of fiscal decentralization. The study confirms predictions in the theoretical literature about the negative impact of local political control on services that have public goods characteristics and inter-jurisdictional externalities. The author discusses reasons for the difference between low- and middle-income countries.Public Health Promotion,Banks&Banking Reform,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Decentralization,Municipal Financial Management,National Governance,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Governance Indicators

Achieving accountability through decentralization : lessons for integrated river basin management

While decentralization holds out the promise of increased flexibility and efficiency, the preconditions for realizing it are daunting. To draw lessons for productive decentralization in integrated river basin management, this paper surveys the decentralization experience in education, health care, roads, irrigation, and public infrastructure services. Case studies reveal that the prime focus in the design of a decentralized structure must be accountability, based on principles of subsidiarity, transparency, and allocation of property rights. While some debates are sector-specific, others, such as the need for political and financial accountability, the related data requirements, educating stakeholders and potential beneficiaries of the new system, and ensuring effective participation are true of decentralization wherever it is to unfold. Inturn, initial conditions and the adaptation of political leadership to suit the historical context determine the success of decentralization. Four issues demand high priority in integrated river basin management. These are (1) overcoming financial inadequacy at the local level; (2) commitment to upgrading skills, particularly management skills, while also ensuring that the expertise accumulated in central bureaucracies is not dissipated; (3) assuring pre-reform beneficiaries that their rights would be protected; and (4) sustaining a long-term commitment to an inevitably slow and drawn out decentralization process. The main conclusions of the literature survey caution those who believe that decentralization is, in itself, a solution to problems of inefficiency and inequity in developing countries. Tradeoffs and tensions need to be reconciled (such as economies of scale versus local monitoring and integrated management or interregional equity versus local control).Municipal Financial Management,Decentralization,Water Conservation,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies,Municipal Financial Management,Environmental Economics&Policies,National Governance,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Banks&Banking Reform

From participation to governance : a critical review of the concepts of governance, co-management and participation, and their implementation in small-scale inland fisheries in developing countries

This report reviews the role, nature and mechanisms of governance in inland fisheries. We do so by reviewing first the wider issues of governance, participation and co-management in natural resource management, and then focus on small-scale fisheries, and, in particular, small-scale (artisanal) activities operated within inland (river and adjacent floodplains) areas in developing countries.Fisheries, Developing countries, Fishery management

Working in decentralised service systems: challenges and choices for the Australian aid program

The report examined Australia’s support for service systems in decentralised contexts - the evaluation focussed on the health, education and infrastructure (water, sanitation and roads) sectors. Foreword Public services have been decentralised in most countries where Australia provides aid. This means Australia, like other donors, must be willing and able to engage effectively with developing country governments at all levels to improve service delivery. To ensure sustainable improvements, this engagement should carefully coordinate support for governance reforms with assistance to strengthen or expand service delivery systems. As the World Bank has observed, done well, decentralisation can result in more efficient and effective services for communities. However, done poorly, or where the context is inappropriate, decentralisation may have negative effects. This evaluation builds on the Office of Development Effectiveness’s 2009 evaluation of Australian aid for service delivery. It answers important questions about whether Australian aid has appropriately considered the role of subnational authorities, including specific issues identified in 2009. It assesses how well Australian aid has addressed the challenges of decentralisation, with a focus on the major sectors of education, health and infrastructure. This evaluation utilised a clear methodology, applied it consistently, and draws together a range of evidence to provide a balanced account of Australian aid performance. It concludes that Australian aid is beginning to respond to the challenges of supporting service delivery in decentralised contexts, but notes that results are mixed and there is room for further improvement. The evaluation suggests Australia needs to improve its country-level analysis, program planning and design to better address decentralisation. In particular, there is a need to carefully assess short-term service delivery needs against long-term structures and incentives for governments to achieve sustainable service delivery and meet sovereign responsibilities. Australia needs to get the right balance of engagement with different levels of government, and appropriately address both supply and demand aspects of service delivery, especially to improve equity.   &nbsp

The Political Economy of Village Sanitation in South India: Capture or Poor Information?

Despite efforts to mandate and finance local governments' provision of environmental sanitation services, outcomes remain poor in the villages surveyed in the four South Indian states. The analysis indicates some key issues that appear to hinder improvements in sanitation. Local politicians tend to capture sanitary infrastructure and cleaning services for themselves, while also keeping major village roads reasonably well-served. Their decisions suggest, however, that they neither understand the health benefits of sanitation, nor the negative externalities to their own health if surrounding areas are poorly served. Our findings suggest that improving sanitary outcomes requires disseminating information on the public goods nature of their health benefits, as well as on the local government's responsibilities. It also requires putting public health regulations in place, along with measures to enable accountability in service provision.access to services; accountability; Accounting; affiliates; agricultural output; agriculture; air; air freight; air transport; Backbone; bank loans; Bank of Tanzania; Banking sector

Decentralisation in Uganda : exploring the constraints for poverty reduction

It is often claimed that decentralisation is effective for the reduction of poverty due to inherent opportunities for higher popular participation and increased efficiency in public service delivery. This paper is a qualitative assessment of the potential of the Ugandan decentralisation reform for poverty alleviation. The Ugandan government initiated an ambitious decentralisation reform in 1992, which represents an example of full-fledged devolution with the transfer of far-reaching responsibilities to local governments. However, several shortcomings, such as low levels of accountability, insufficient human and financial resources, corruption, patronage, and central resistance to decentralisation, constrain the proper implementation of the reform, putting improvements in participation and efficiency at risk and ultimately jeopardising the intended impact on poverty.Es wird oft behauptet, dass Dezentralisierung durch die ihr inhärenten Möglichkeiten zur Steigerung der Partizipation der Bevölkerung an öffentlichen Entscheidungsprozessen sowie zur Erhöhung der Effizienz in der Bereitstellung öffentlicher Dienstleistungen effektiv zur Reduktion von Armut beitragen kann. Dieser Frage geht die vorliegende qualitative Studie am Fall der Dezentralisierung in Uganda nach. Die ugandische Regierung leitete im Jahr 1992 eine ehrgeizige Dezentralisierungsreform ein, die ein Beispiel für konsequente Devolution mit der Übertragung weitgehender Rechte, Aufgaben und Finanzen an lokale Regierungen darstellt. Die Umsetzung dieser Reform leidet jedoch unter verschiedenen Restriktionen, so etwa niedriger Accountability, ungenügender Human- und finanzieller Ressourcen, Korruption, Patronage sowie anhaltender zentraler Einflussnahme auf die lokale Politik. Diese Defizite gefährden ernsthaft die Erhöhung von Partizipation und Effizienz und damit letztendlich auch eine Reduktion der Armut

ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEVOLVED GOVERNANCE, POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION, AND SERVICE DELIVERY:A CRITICAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This paper seeks to critically review the existing literature on the relationship between the devolved governance aspect of political decentralization, and its influence on service delivery. The study will be based on the context of devolved governments in Kenya. This review specifically evaluates the theoretical and empirical literatures related to political decentralization and service delivery with an aim of establishing areas of gaps for further research. In particular, the paper identifies some of the important theoretical, conceptual, measurements, contextual, and methodological drawbacks in previous researches. However, it also identifies other literatures that restrict generalization of results to a particular contexts, sectors, and larger populations. Additionally, several research avenues have been proposed for in-depth understanding of the relationship between political decentralization and service delivery

Governance decentralization and local infrastructure provision in Indonesia:

This paper examines the recent decentralization of governance in Indonesia and its impact on local infrastructure provision. The decentralization of decisionmaking power to local jurisdictions in Indonesia may have improved the matching of public infrastructures provision with local preferences. However, decentralization has made local public infrastructures depend on local resources. Due to differences in initial endowments, this may result in the divergence of local public infrastructures in rich and poor jurisdictions. Using data from village-level panel surveys conducted in 1996, 2000, and 2006, this paper finds that (1) local public infrastructures depend on local resources, (2) decentralization has improved the availability of local public infrastructures, (3) local jurisdictions are converging to a similar level of local public infrastructure, and (4) to some extent, decentralized public infrastructures' provision reflects local preferences.Decentralization, local public goods, indonesia,